origins of the settler colonial state and its law, contemporary Aboriginal rights jurisprudence, and government policies that have left Aboriginal communities dispossessed and marginalized. He presents a passionate and nuanced critique of the failure of the recent political and legal recognition of Aboriginal rights to significantly change the lives of Aboriginal communities. 3 In the best spirit of critique, Borrows also presents his audience with his vision of a new political and legal order in Canada, one which would not only heed the call for increased Aboriginal representation in political, legal, and social institutions, but one that would incorporate Aboriginal law and legal knowledges into existing legal structures. The author attempts to re-map the boundaries of citizenship to include other ways of being, other forms of governance, other ways of conceptualizing our relationships to land, resources, and each other.
John Borrows' book pushes the boundaries of several different and overlapping bodies of work. One is the existing work on Aboriginal rights in Canada;
another is post-colonial literature that addresses issues of (cultural) identity, difference and rights; and third, the more specific literature on the concept of recognition. Borrows' book doesn't remain confined to one of these 'fields' of scholarly inquiry, but pushes the boundaries between them through innovative arguments and analyses.
The body of work on Aboriginal rights in Canada is of course very diverse in perspective, analysis and prescription. Aboriginal rights and legal scholarship necessarily encapsulates a wide range of disciplinary and topical threads. Some people have taken on the task of recovering histories of Aboriginal communities, with a view to re-shaping the dominant historiography of colonial settlement and attendant myths about the state of Aboriginal societies, cultural practices, laws, languages and bodies of knowledge. Other scholars have addressed the legislative and judicial identity and rights. Borrows builds on existing critiques of the way in which culture has been conceived of and commodified within a paradigm of multiculturalism 9 by demonstrating how Aboriginal law can and ought to be used and incorporated within mainstream jurisprudence. As I explore in greater detail below, he illuminates how embracing Aboriginal difference can mean the creation of sui generis law, which would be the unique result of both Aboriginal and common law legal reasoning and precedent.
Borrows skilfully presents the reader with an introduction to an alternative epistemological and ontological paradigm in which to think about relations between individuals, communities, and the environment. He also persuasively contests a dominant historiography that relegates indigenous legal knowledges and modes of governance to an irretrievable past. Borrows presents a compelling 'un-covering' and interpretation of histories that refute common sense assumptions that Aboriginal sovereignty, including self-governance, modes of land use, and legal orders, were not recognized during the time of settlement or were extinguished. 10 He elucidates the ways in which there was the simultaneous recognition and non-recognition of Borrows, [4] [5] [6] [7] reached, and how the vision of co-existence that this particular treaty reflects has not materialized.
14 As Borrows point out, there has also been a parallel line of cases that have denied such recognition of Indigenous laws. Both historically and in contemporary caselaw, Aboriginal law and interests have been deemed to be a burden on Crown law, which is paramount. 15 It is this line of reasoning that has been predominant and reflects a failure of recognition of Aboriginal law and interests, which, has in turn, resulted in the legal, political, social and economic repression and marginalisation of Aboriginal communities.
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In this review essay, I use Borrows' book as a focal point for a discussion of the concepts of recognition, identity and difference-themes which are undoubtedly important to the subject matter of his book and which also make his book relevant to a wide audience. I situate Borrows' work in current debates about the politics of recognition 17 , and the problems inherent in identity-based rights claims. Although these problems have been thoroughly dealt with in what is by now a rather large body of literature 18 , the problems with the identity/difference relation persist, as (some) marginalized communities continue to make claims for legal and political recognition as the means towards decolonization or liberation.
Borrows does not explicitly situate his work within the theories of recognition that derive their foundation from Hegel's theory of mutual recognition, as do Charles
Taylor and Axel Honneth. However, it is my view that the substance of his arguments in Recovering Canada involve the question of legal recognition, the form which this 14 Borrows, 150. Also see John Borrows, "Indian Agency: Forming First Nations Law in Canada" in Political and Legal Anthropology Review, Volume 24, No.2, 2001, p.9-24, at p.16 15 Borrows, Recovering Canada, 7 16 Borrows, 8 17 The "politics of recognition" is a phrase that is most often used to refer to Charles Taylor's seminal essay, "The Politics of Recognition" in A. Gutmann ed. Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) . While I use the term to refer to his essay, I will distinguish his theory of recognition from a broader discussion of Hegel's dialectic of mutual recognition below. 18 For critiques of the identity/difference formulation, and more particularly, identity politics and legal rights At stake in the recognition of the rights of the Aboriginal (legal) subject is the particular way in which this subject comes into being in relation to the non-Aboriginal population, and vice-versa. The phenomenon of recognition shapes the contours of both the marginalized subject who seeks recognition and those who "recognize".
The recognition of indigenous rights in Canada has failed, in many respects, to displace the colonial nature of legal and political relations. Recognition has been tied to a paradigm of identity and difference that is devoid of mutuality; the only legal recognition that has been realised is of the subject already proper to existing boundaries of colonial sovereignty. The Aboriginal subject claiming recognition has been circumscribed, in other words, by a restricted economy 20 of recognition, in 19 For instance, see Borrows' discussion of the recognition of Indigenous laws by the Canadian state at pages 4, 5, 9, 11, 12; risks and effects of non-recognition at 90; discussion of pluralism and reconciliation at 8, 9, 12, 88-90; recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty at 97; and the dialogic transformations of communities involved in the recognition of indigenous laws at 148. 20 I use the term "restricted economy of recognition" as a derivation from Derrida's critique of the Hegelian concept of the aufhebung in his essay "From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve" (Derrida 2003) . In this piece, Derrida takes on Georges Bataille's critique and discussion of Hegel's thought as set out in L'expérience intérieure, "Hegel, la mort et le sacrifice" and other pieces (Bataille, 1990, 9-28) . Derrida critiques the dialectic of recognition on the basis that potentially different shapes and forms of thought and Being are imprisoned within a "restricted economy" of meaning, history and life (Derrida, 2002a, 318, 322) . This is a restricted economy in which all meaning, and shapes and contours of Being, are caught within a logic of appropriation and reserve. Just as there is no space for difference to emerge within the dialectic of recognition (which presupposes a particular ideal of universal Humanity), there is no (easy) escape from the totalising dynamic of which the Court acknowledges only those rights claims that fit within already existing political, economic and legal relations founded upon a colonial sovereignty. The struggle for recognition can be understood as a means by which the sovereign self, in shoring up his own identity, refuses to recognise any desires, qualities and characteristics that do not mirror his own image and thereby subjugates the other who seeks recognition. I will explore this critique in detail below.
In the context of identity-based rights claims, recognition is thus understood to operate as a means by which the state, in reinscribing the legitimacy of its colonial foundations, refuses to recognise any qualities, characteristics, activities or customs that do not fit within the bounds of a colonial legal framework. As long as the recognition of the Aboriginal subject of rights is situated within this restricted economy, the relations of power that facilitated the marginalization of the Aboriginal subject is reinscribed-paradoxically, in the very claim for inclusion. 21 In the colonial settler context, this conundrum appears to be practically inescapable.
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More specifically, the question that emerges from the critique of the restricted economy of recognition is whether the recognition of communities on the basis of their cultural, ethnic, or racial "distinctiveness" can avoid raising the spectres of essence and authenticity. By now a well worn argument, critics of an identity-based politics argue that asserting a right on the basis of a cultural, racial or ethnic identity presupposes the existence of a pure, reified essence that is constitutive of one's being. 23 Ultimately, I argue that cultural difference operates as the modality through While we can acknowledge that cultural identities are fluid, hybrid, and always changing, the moment that we make a rights claim based on these partial and contingent identities, it becomes necessary -at least momentarily-to represent this cultural identity in a complete, bounded which the totalising movement of the dialectic of recognition captures the "difference" that has always already been proper to the self-or the subject-which itself inscribes this difference. I will discuss how Borrows' conception of a sui generis legal order goes a great distance in breaking out of the pitfalls of cultural authenticity and the reification of the difference that has characterised the reception of Aboriginal rights claims by the courts. However, I also explore how this process of intersubjective recognition, which avoids the problems of reification and authenticity, could be realized butt the cost, form. It becomes necessary to represent the cultural community as possessing an essential difference that makes it distinct-because it is that distinctiveness that forms the basis of the rights claim. If identity formation is actually always in flux, and moreover, takes place between two subjects or more, then basing claims for justice on an identity of cultural difference would appear, to the contrary, to deny the existence of the subject and (its) particularity. elements of pre-contact culture", but to ensure the survival of those communities today.
As Borrows points out, the Court, in Van der Peet, first found it necessary to define the term 'Aboriginal' for the purposes of adjudicating Aboriginal rights claims.
Aboriginal difference from what is non-Aboriginal lies at the heart of Aboriginal rights doctrine. This basis of the right itself, entrenches the concept of 'essence' at the heart of Aboriginal rights doctrine-it presupposes as its constitutive criteria something distinctly -or essentially-Aboriginal about the right being asserted. While Borrows argues that the sui generis doctrine encapsulates the balance and interplay between similarity and difference that exists (or ought to exist) between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities.
The sui generis doctrine expresses the confidence that there are sufficient similarities between the groups to enable them to live with their differences. Under this doctrine, points of agreement can be highlighted and issues of difference can be preserved to facilitate more productive and peaceful relations. The sui generis doctrine reformulates similarity and difference and thereby captures the complex, overlapping, and exclusive identities and relationships of the parties.
(emphasis added)
35 Borrows, 9
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Borrows, 10
There is a potential contradiction between arguing for the development of a sui generis form of law while at the same time arguing for the preservation of difference.
Borrows' preferred vision of legal pluralism is not one that entails a simple expansion of existing legal and political institutions to include Aboriginal perspectives (although this is definitely one aspect of his argument), but rather, a co-mingling of legal knowledges and orders that would in effect create something entirely unique, or sui generis. Borrows' concept of a sui generis legal order challenges an economy of similarities (or 'sameness') and 'difference' which rely upon reified or essentialist understandings of cultural difference in order to envision the creation of a unique order of law and legal knowledges.
C. Re-mapping the rule of law
In Chapter 4, Borrows renders a stunning and detailed analysis of Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia. another. The first exemplar of the 'myth' of 'equality' was the proposed White Paper of the Liberal government in 1969, which contained policies that were aimed at the assimilation of Aboriginal peoples as the means to achieving equality among all.
Raven "sees how the promise of equality can become a pretext for eliminating different ways of evaluating life."
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Leaping to the present day, Raven (in the guise of a well known member of the media) provocatively makes a speech during a time of debate over the Nisga'a Final Agreement in which he speaks of "race based entitlements" and segregation.
By invoking popular arguments about the perils of "special group rights" that were used by opponents of the Treaty, Raven is actually referring to the race based entitlements historically enjoyed initially by white European settlers, and then later, by other non-Aboriginal immigrants. The Trickster "wonders who [the audience] will see in his words, and to whom they will attribute wisdom and foolishness." The defendants accused were a group of non-Aboriginal fishermen. Interestingly, the provincial court judge found that the pilot sales fishery "draws a distinction and defines two groups on the basis of whether or not individuals have a bloodline connection to the Musqueam, Burrard, or Tsawwassen Bands", that this is "analogous to a racial distinction" and as a result violates the section 15 rights of the accused. He found that "this has the effect of promoting the view that these individuals are… less worthy of recognition, and less valuable as members of Canadian society." [para 203] Ultimately, finding that the regulations and fishery scheme are ineffectual, the judge found that they could not be "saved" or justified by section 1 of the Charter. However, I argue that contemporary understandings of 'humanity' as now including those peoples who were previously seen by Europeans as backwards and uncivilized, and therefore appropriate beings for colonial subjugation, and the law that facilitated this colonization, cannot be neatly divorced from one another. That is, the contemporary disavowal of ideologies of the past that underlay colonization cannot be neatly mapped onto foundational legal tenets such as rule of law. Rather, it is my view that such concepts also have a history -replete with blood and violenceEven the perceived loss of privilege with the recognition of an Aboriginal treaty right to fish has sparked violence on the part of non-Aboriginal fishermen. Throughout the fall of 1999, Aboriginal fishermen on the east coast faced physical violence and harassment at the hands of non-Aboriginal fisherman after the Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed the treaty right of the Mi'kmaq people to trade (fish) for necessaries. (See R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456) The storm of protest on the part of nonAboriginal fishermen and the motion for a re-hearing and a stay by the West Nova Fishermen's Coalition resulted in a further judgment, in which the Court clarified its initial judgment and reassured the petitioners that they had not affirmed a treaty right that was not subject to State regulation. (R. v. Marshall [No.2] [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533). The Court explained to the petitioners that the issue of whether the federal fishery regulations under which Donald Marshall had been charged were a justifiable limitation on the Mi'kmaq treaty right was not before the Court as the Crown had not made any such argument. Having found an Aboriginal treaty right to trade fish for necessaries, Donald Marshall was entitled to be acquitted of the charges of fishing out of season and other, related charges. 43 Borrows, 108 44 Borrows, 97 that cannot simply be emptied out and re-inscribed with new meaning in a clean, post-colonial sweep towards justice.
PART II. RE-COVERING THE LIMITS: CALLING INTO QUESTION A POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE
I have identified three different questions about the type of pluralism envisioned by Borrows and the limits of current form of recognition in the Canadian context. The first two issues relate to problems inherent in the politics of difference that underlies recognition, which in my view, Borrows successfully transcends. The third question is a critique of Borrows' reliance on fundamental legal tenets as the appropriate means through which to realise his radical legal pluralism.
The first question is about the potential for recognizing difference within a paradigm of recognition. What is the nature of the difference that is recognized? Is there space within a theory of mutual recognition for the recognition of a difference that encompasses ways of being, and relations between beings that derive from 'other' epistemological and ontological grounds? I argue that currently, the difference that is recognized within Aboriginal rights caselaw is only that which is proper to the self (or subject) who is already in existence. This is in large part due to the fact that (perhaps with the influence of the ideology of official multiculturalism in Canada), the difference that is recognized (and preserved) through Aboriginal rights claims is limited to the recognition of a cultural identity of "Aboriginality". The cultural difference that is recognized is defined as that which is proper to the existing political, economic and legal structures of the Canadian state. Defining Aboriginal difference in terms of cultural difference prevents a rupture of existing relations of power, rooted in the history of colonial settlement, which enables one entity to bestow recognition upon the party seeking legal rights from the state. In order for a meaningful shift towards a post-colonial political community, 'difference' would have to be defined in a way that accounts for the material, ontological and epistemological aspects of subject formation and rights claims.
I argue that the legal changes and transformation Borrows proposes, the result of which can be characterized as sui generis law, rupture the boundaries of a restricted economy of recognition. The concept of sui generis law requires a substantive transformation of the colonial foundations of the legal system and the political-philosophical concepts that underlie governance and the economy. Given that the only difference that is cognisable within a paradigm of recognition is that which is proper to what already exists, I argue that the radical changes that would result from such a 'co-mingling of legal orders' could not be realised within the bounds of the recognition of cultural difference as it currently operates in the Canadian context.
The second question takes a slightly different point of departure. While a theory of recognition allows for the transformation of the subject or in this case, the nation, through the process of the mutual recognition of different communities, it also facilitates the preservation of 'difference'. If we accept Borrows' proposition that a melding of different legal orders is possible, in such a way as to create something new and unique but at the same time to preserve the integrity of these different strands of legal orders, is the preservation of cultural difference, with its problems of essence and authenticity possible or even desirable?
The final question I raise is about the basis upon which Borrows argues for a new legal and political order. He argues for the application of foundational concepts such as the rule of law, federalism, democracy and the respect for minorities in the move towards creating a just foundation for the Canadian state. My question concerns the rule of law, and the concept of sovereignty to which it is bound. Can the very radical notions of decolonisation (expressed in the first four chapters) be realized through the use of concepts such as the rule of law? How can concepts such as the 'rule of law' and 'sovereignty' which lay at the very foundation of colonial rule and settlement be redeployed in order to create a decolonised legal and political community?
A. The essence of (cultural) difference and Hegel's dialectic of recognition
Within the paradigm of 'difference', difference has been defined as "cultural" difference. Charles Taylor's seminal essay on the topic, "The Politics of Recognition" emphasizes the centrality of the recognition of identity-as cultural and linguistic distinctiveness 45 -to freedom from oppression and social harms. 46 It is the mis-or non-recognition of people's identities that have contributed to a self-image of inferiority and other ills. 47 The mutual recognition of identities by equals is the means to allowing individuals and cultural (linguistic) communities to attain full self-hood, equality and dignity.
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Taylor takes the dialectic of mutual recognition from Hegel, and transposes it into contemporary political and social struggles in the Canadian context, most notably, the struggle of the Quebecois for self-determination. Taylor defines identity as a term that "designates something like a person's understanding of who they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a human being" 49 and also "who we are, 'where we're coming from'". 50 The universal quality that grounds the politics of difference (i.e. that quality or thing that provides sufficient similarity for all human beings to co-exist) is "the potential for forming and defining one's own identity, as an individual, and also as a culture." 51 There is an important movement (or slippage)
here from the individual to the cultural 'community' or collective. The leap from the desire for recognition of the modern individualist self to that of the social collectivity presents some difficulties. Taylor deals with this by way of reference to Herder, 45 Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in Amy Gutmann ed. Mutual recognition between individual subjects occurs on the basis that the universal similarity between subjects is nothing else but the desire for recognition by another. Putting this desire into action, or petitioning or addressing the other for recognition-even before the recognition is realized-is a transformative process for the subject. 53 While the term "culture" can signify a wide range of practices, knowledges, and ways of being, when placed in the paradigm of recognition, the fluidity and constantly changing nature of cultural practices becomes difficult, if not impossible to maintain when the phenomenon of recognition is transposed into a liberal democratic rights regime. The address or petition for recognition, when made by a cultural community, is on the basis of a difference that has to already be in existence if it is to be recognized. This means that in the act of a community representing itself as having a particular cultural identity, the fluidity, contingency and movement that is actually characteristic of practises and 'traditions' in cultural communities is captured. As Butler points out, this is inevitable in the context of asserting rights and claiming legal protection on the basis of membership in a group or class. 54 She also notes that wrenching this 'captured' identity away from an understanding of who we are in a more general or broad sense is very difficult. At the initial stage of the master-slave dialectic, and this stage of the development of self-consciousness, man seeks recognition from other men but has yet to see-and has failed to see-how he relates to (or is) the universal. In this failure, he has failed to see other men as beings equal to himself, but only sees the reflection of his own self in these men. 57 The main principle man grasps is his superiority to others, and thus feels compelled to overcome this other in order to prove his superiority. Unlike at later stages, at this early stage man fails to recognize how recognition is "something that in principle should be extended to all." 58 Recognition is not a mutual endeavour at this stage, but a kind of recognition that can only come to be in a situation of domination or war or even, and ultimately, the annihilation of the other.
However, annihilation defeats the purpose of the struggle for recognition. 61 Important in the context of the master-slave dialectic is that one side gives in just before it comes to death, recognizing it's attachment to life, and becomes enslaved by the other. In order to avoid death, the slave submits to the master's will. While the master becomes complacent in his position of power over his slaves, who recognize his self and superiority, the slaves eventually recognize, through their labour and work in the world, their power to transform the world, the external reality. In this realization of their power over their environment, the seeds of their liberation lie. Taylor describes this as a What is required by the self-consciousness struggling for recognition is a relationship with the (or its) other which will reflect the reality of self-consciousness' being as an "emanation of universal Geist." 62 The realization of each subject's relationship to the universal, and the desire to create and to be sustained by an external reality that reflects this relationship, requires recognition by an other human being who "will annul its own foreignness, [but] in which the subject can nevertheless find himself." 63 This recognition is found not as or in an(other) human being existing merely as a subject in existence-for-itself, but as -and in -a human being who recognizes the humanity of the self-consciousness seeking recognition.
Hegel's theory of the coming into being of the subject and intersubjective relations are two aspects of the same process; self-consciousness cannot come into being fully without the recognition of an other self-consciousness, and without the other who is simultaneously seeking the recognition of the other self-consciousness as well. In the context of this double signification, where self-consciousness comes into being through a kind of mutual recognition, it "comes out of itself" and appears to posit its other. Self-consciousness posits its other insofar as it believes, mistakenly, that the other (self-consciousness) is not independent (when in fact it is). Selfconsciousness, in the initial moment, overcomes its other. The self splits; "the middle breaks forth into extremes;" one of which is the merely recognized, and the other is the merely recognizing. 64 Each extreme exists in opposition to the other; and the opposition is overcome as they each transform into their opposites. But what of the middle term, self-consciousness?
Although, as consciousness, it does indeed come out of itself, yet, though out of itself, it is at the same time kept back within itself, is for itself, and the self outside it, is for it. It is aware that it at once is, and is not, another consciousness, and equally that this other is for itself only when it supersedes itself as being for itself, and is for itself only in the being-forforeshadowing of historical materialism-"conceptual thinking arises out of the learned ability to transform things." Taylor We can see from this passage that each self-consciousness relies upon another independently existing self-consciousness to similarly transform itself. Selfconsciousness seems to be both another consciousness and independent of this other consciousness. Gillian Rose offers an interpretation of the presentation of otherness in Hegel's dialectic in the following terms:
[T]he separation out of otherness as such is derived from the failure of mutual recognition on the part of two self-consciousnesses who encounter each other and refuse to recognise the other as itself a selfrelation. This applies to oneself as other and, equally, to any opposing self-consciousness: my relation to myself is mediated by what I recognise or refuse to recognize in your relation to yourself; while your self-relation depends on what you recognize of my relation to myself.
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In this passage, Rose makes the profoundly intersubjective nature of the Hegelian dialectic clear. This aspect of recognition is represented as the activity of only one self-consciousness, and thus it appears that self-consciousness posits its other, and the action is that of only one self-consciousness. However, "the other is equally independent and self-contained, and there is nothing in it of which it is not itself the origin." 67 The action that is necessary for recognition is both that of each self-consciousness acting individually; it is of double significance because it is the action of each self-consciousness acting against itself as well as against the other self-consciousness.
One conclusion to draw from this aspect of Hegel's theory of the subject (selfconsciousness "A") and intersubjectivity is that the other (self-consciousness "B") is uniquely different and independent from the subject. and independent from A. And certainly, those scholars who laud the political and ethical dimensions of Hegel's philosophy of intersubjectivity do so because of the "respect for difference" that it is seen to entail. Moreover, I argue that this reading of the dialectic of recognition is equally as plausible as the critique that follows; the outcome of the drama of recognition is contingent upon the circumstances in which it unfolds.
However, a more critical reading of this dialectic questions the nature of difference that is cognisable within a recognition paradigm. Recall that the 'other' is simultaneously posited by the self as one extreme aspect of itself, while it is also an independently existing self-consciousness in its own right. How can the particularity, or the difference of the other be said to be kept intact when each self-consciousness requires and relies upon another self-consciousness that necessarily moves towards it own becoming and its other in an identical fashion? What is the nature of difference when what is required by self-consciousness is the recognition of an other that is already designated as a reflection of itself? The other that is required for mutual recognition is one which posits its own other, "comes out itself", and is then absorbed and superceded by itself and its other in an act of mutual recognition and reconciliation (aufhebung). The other that is required by self-consciousness is both a reflection of self-consciousness and also an independently existing other selfconsciousness-but identical, in many respects, to self-consciousness nonetheless.
Jean-Luc Nancy states this problematic in the following way:
[I]dentity, while pulling itself together, assumes and resorbs within itself the differences that constitute it: both its difference from the other, whom it posits as such, and its difference from itself, simultaneously implied and abolished in the movement of "grasping itself." In this way, finally, identity makes difference: it presents itself as preeminently different from all other identity and from all nonidentity; relating itself to itself, it relegates the other to a self (or to an absence of self) that is different. Being the very movement proper to self-consciousness, identity-or the Self that identifies itself-therefore makes difference itself, difference proper: and this property designates or denotes itself as "man." Identities of the self and the other-as difference-come to exist as properties in and of themselves. The difference that is posited by the Self is one that is proper to the Self or subject. This difference becomes property in that it designates the human as human, or the subject as human; 69 this is property in the sense of being a characteristic proper to the subject, and also something that is knowable, quantifiable, tangible, capable of being possessed.
The proper(tied) nature of identity and difference fits within an ontological "economy of the same" 70 in which difference is not really difference at all, but a presupposed, assumed counterpart to the self-same subject. If, as Nancy postulates, "the life of spirit does not tremble before its own differentiation, not even in death, for there too it maintains itself," the question that remains is "where can a different identity come from? From where can B come to A?
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Hegel maintains that while self-consciousness may be represented as the journey and transformation of one self-consciousness, the other is originarily independent and self-contained. 72 Nancy responds to this insistent assertion of the independent "origin" of the other self-consciousness by stating that the "the path of self-consciousness can easily lead through desire and recognition of the other, but it is traced beforehand as the circular process of the Self of this consciousness." 73 Nancy's critique challenges the notion that there is any space within the and practices in a time and space that is separate and distinct from the contemporary, post-colonial order in order to avoid any disruptions of the 'present'.
The recognition and acceptance of differences between communities (within the boundaries of one nation state) in political organization, economic ideologies and practices, land and resource use, would bend the overarching structure of the nation state out of shape and radically alter its boundaries. This is desirable and necessary in the context of decolonization-and while I do want to conclude that this is impossible within a dialectic of recognition, it has not been realized in the colonial settler context that denies the recognition of difference beyond the bounds of cultural difference.
There is ample evidence in the caselaw to support this view. In the Canadian context, the recognition of the proper Aboriginality is accomplished through the language of cultural distinctiveness, with its criteria of primordial, authentic essence that is consistently used by the courts to narrow or limit the recognition of an Aboriginal right. 74 Where the Courts do recognize an activity as an Aboriginal right that is commercial in nature, they take steps to circumscribe it in the interests of the Although the Aboriginal rights recognized by section 35(1) are, as was noted in Van der Peet, fundamentally different from the rights in the Charter, the same basic principle-that the purposes underlying the rights must inform not only the definition of the rights but also the identification of those limits on the rights which are justifiable-applies equally to the justification analysis under s.35(1). (Hogg, 2000, 720) . The four criterion to be "satisfied by a law that qualifies as a reasonable limit that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" derive from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. They are the following: 1) the law must pursue an objective that is sufficiently important to justify limiting a Charter right; 2) the law must be rationally connected to the objective; 3) the law must impair the right no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective; 4) the law must not have a disproportionately severe effect on the persons to whom it applies (Hogg, 2000, 735) . Where the Aboriginal right engaged involves economic resources, the Court has tended to circumscribe the right more narrowly, and widen the parameters of what constitutes a justifiable limitation on the exercise of that right. In Sparrow, the right claimed was a right to fish for food, a right which has an inherent limit. There is only so much fish that is required to fulfill this need for food of a particular community.
Commercial fisheries, however, which respond to the needs of an insatiable market, have no such limit. The economic development of mines and forests is similarly only restrained by a limit point determined by the people in charge of regulating the exploitation of such resources. Where the Aboriginal right being claimed confronts the economic development of the province or involves capitalist enterprises such as the commercial fishery, the rights and limitation analyses, as well as the justification tests, take on different contours.
Thus in Delgamuukw, the Court finds practically any activity that has as its objective the promotion of economic development in the interior of the province of British Columbia can legitimately infringe an Aboriginal right to title over that land:
In my opinion, the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support those aims are the kinds of objectives that are consistent with this purpose, and in principle, can justify the infringement of Aboriginal title. Van der Peet, para 91 87 One may speculate on what would be considered a "defining" characteristic of the settler population for the purposes of rights adjudication, from the perspective of a person who comes from a radically different society. Is the right to equality for instance, a "defining" characteristic of our day to day social, cultural and political practices, or is it merely incidental to the dominant and definitive activities of earning a livelihood, and exchanging money for goods? Is the right to freedom of expression a defining characteristic of our society, or is it merely incidental to the distinctive institution of property ownership and freedom to contract?
acknowledged the existence of such trade, it was not an "integral" aspect or "defining" character of this Mohawk community. 88 The Court finds the following:
[Trading goods across the St. Lawrence River] was not vital to the Mohawk's collective identity. It was not something that "truly made the society what it was" (Van der Peet, at para 55 (emphasis in original)). Participation in northerly trade was therefore not a practice integral to the distinctive culture of the Mohawk people.
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It is difficult to imagine a situation in which trade for commercial purposes could ever be characterized as a defining cultural feature of any society, or to turn this proposition around, where commercial activities could ever be separated from the defining cultural features of any society.
It is apparent that the recognition of Aboriginal rights is circumscribed by an economy of difference in which that which is recognized is always already proper to existing political, legal and economic structures. "Culture" and cultural difference is the particular modality through which any 'difference' that would transform the existing whole that is the nation is contained. The desires of Aboriginal rights claimants are continually negated in this process. Does the concept of a sui generis legal take us beyond these limits?
B. The persistence of essence and authenticity: sui generis transformation or the preservation of difference?
As discussed above, Borrows argues for the co-mingling of different legal orders that would result in a sui generis law. At the time of settlement, the assertion of Crown sovereignty was accomplished in the name of 'the rule of law' that Borrows wants to rely upon as the basis for a just legal and political order. As Fitzpatrick writes:
[E]very tale of law's bringing order to disordered times and places, along with the triumph of such things as modernity or capitalist social relations, can be matched by others where it created uncertainty and inflicted massive disorder in the same cause.
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The 'rule of law' was used as a basis for the establishment of colonial sovereignty, bringing such things as order, stability and peace to colonial settler society. At the same time, it caused massive disruption for the colonized. The rule of law is intimately connected to the very same colonial 'sovereignty' that Borrows would like to call into question. The rule of law, in fact, could be seen to depend on sovereignty itself. The rule of law depends on the existence of a sovereign power. Sovereignty is defined through its exclusive monopoly over power. Borrows argues that because there was and is no legitimate basis for the assertion of colonial sovereignty, there was an arbitrary abuse of power which violated the rule of law. But there could be no 'rule of law' without the assertion of a putatively "absolute" or totalising sovereignty.
Law demands and requires a foundation-a founding act-which is inherently violent. While law may alter this 'originary moment' in order to be responsive to ever changing circumstances and conditions, it will always do so in order to preserve its own foundations 103 and its power. This foundation in the Canadian context is colonization and in legal terms, (colonial) Crown sovereignty. Borrows argues that a more peaceful and productive future demands a disruption of existing socio-political relations, and the positing of a just foundation. It is not this fact that I take issue with, but rather, the impossibility of creating a just foundation through the deployment of the rule of law which it tied to the colonial sovereignty that is supposed to be excised.
Concepts such as "rule of law", and "democracy" as they have developed Liberal freedom, fitted to an economic order in which property and personhood for some entails poverty and deracination for others, is conveyed by rights against arbitrary state power on one side and against anarchic civil society or property theft on the other. As freedom from encroachment by others and from collective institutions, it entails an atomistic ontology, a metaphysics of separation, an ethos of defensiveness, and an abstract equality. Rendering either the ancient or liberal formations of freedom as "concepts"… not only prevents appreciation of their local and historical character but preempts perception of what is denied and suppressed by them, of what kinds of domination are enacted by particular practices of freedom.
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There is no tradition to which we can go back, make right, or invoke in a movement towards decolonisation.
Conclusion
I have attempted, in this review essay, to raise some doubts about the political efficacy of a theory of recognition generally, and particularly, as it is configured within a politics of difference. I have argued that within the Hegelian paradigm of recognition, the only difference that is recognized is that which is proper to the totality or entity that is already inscribed as the subject, the community, or the 
